Abstract
Introduction
Cognitive Linguistics is a paradigm that originated in the United States in the 1970s and spread to many countries in Europe and to Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and China. It developed into a serious competitor to the hitherto dominant theoretical framework in linguistics, Generative Grammar. Up to the 1950s, the science of language in the United States had had a mainly structuralist orientation, which is known as Descriptivism. Descriptivism is a non-mentalist or even anti-mentalist approach to the study of language, epitomized e.g. in Leonard Bloomfield's influential monograph Language (1933) . Bloomfield was beholden to the then prevalent psychological doctrine of behaviorism: The human mind is a black box, only behavior, i.e. stimulus-response patterns, is observable, and hence statements about the nature of the human mind and its relation to language are speculative and unscientific. The behaviorist approach to language was seriously challenged in 1959 by Noam Chomsky, a young linguist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who wrote a scathing critique of the behaviorist B. F. Skinner's monograph Verbal Behavior (1957) , a review article that appeared in the leading American linguistic journal Language. Chomsky argued that the human language faculty is a "mental organ", as he put it metaphorically, and that hence linguistics crucially involves the study of an important aspect of the human mind.
In his writings, Chomsky distinguishes between two dimensions of language: language as a knowledge system, which he calls linguistic competence, and the application of this system in actual language use, which he dubs linguistic performance. According to Chomsky, the central object of the science of language should be competence, i.e. the (mostly) subconscious knowledge that native speakers have of their mother tongue. Because of the paradigm shift he initiated -from language as a kind of behavior or habit formation to language as an autonomous module of the human mind -Chomsky can be called a "cognitive linguist" avant la lettre, and it is not accidental that leading cognitive linguists in the United States, such as e.g. George Lakoff and Ronald Langacker, originally adhered to the Chomskyan doctrine before developing theoretical frameworks that are, in many ways, incompatible with Chomsky's conception of language and its acquisition (see section 2). Chomsky (1988: 4-5) claims that a purely behaviorist, i.e. empiricist approach to language, faces a conceptual paradox. The paradox is known as Plato's problem, which was already formulated by the British philosopher Bertrand Russell in the following way:
"How comes it that human beings, whose contacts with the world are brief and personal and limited, are able to know as much as they do?" (quoted in Chomsky 1988: 4) Chomsky's answer to Plato's problem with regard to the acquisition of linguistic competence is as follows:
i. Humans learn their mother tongue relatively effortlessly because the language faculty is innate, i.e. a specialized module of the human mind. In other words, humans are born with a "universal grammar", a set of universal grammatical rules, principles, and constraints. Before even starting to learn their native language, infants already "know" at least some of the universal properties that all human languages share. ii. The language faculty is not derivable from other general human cognitive abilities, e.g. intelligence and the cognitive processing of perceptual and experiential events.
What Chomsky's mentalist framework and Cognitive Linguistics have in common is their anti-behaviorist stance. However, Cognitive Linguistics differs substantially from Chomskyan Generative Grammar in at least the following respects:
i. the nature of the linguistic sign, ii. the nature of the language faculty, iii. the cognitive mechanisms at work in the acquisition of language, iv. the overall architecture of grammar, including its relation to phonology, semantics, and pragmatics, and v. the theoretical status of linguistic performance (i.e. actual language use).
Section 2 of this article provides a brief introduction to the variety of paradigms that are designated by the cover term 'Cognitive Linguistics'. Section 3 focuses on metaphor and metonymy, two tropes that in Cognitive Linguistics are regarded not only as figures of language but, importantly, also of thought. Some cognitive linguists, including the present authors, maintain that metonymy is an even more basic figurative device than metaphor, and in sections 4 and 5 the conceptual and pragmatic function of metonymy is analyzed in more detail. In section 4, the crucial role of metonymy in the resolution of conceptual conflicts between construction meaning and lexical meaning is illustrated with some examples. Section 5 considers the workings of metonymy in semiotic modes other than natural language; by way of example, it is shown with one example that the interpretation of visual art may rely on metonymic thinking. Finally, section 6 concludes this contribution with a brief answer to the question whether metonymy is a "dedicated comprehension mechanism".
Some basic theoretical and methodological assumptions of Cognitive Linguistics
In section 1, we have pointed out that in the 1960s cognitive linguists such as Ronald Langacker and George Lakoff were influenced by the Chomskyan paradigm, but especially Lakoff soon began to criticize the conception of language and the architecture of grammar developed in Chomsky (1965) . In accordance with linguists such as John Robert Ross, James D. McCawley, and Paul Postal, Lakoff rejected, among other things, the concepts of syntactic deep structure and interpretative semantics, where the latter is supposed to be based on syntactic deep structure or surface structure as advocated by Chomsky (1965) and Jackendoff (1974) , respectively. In contrast, Lakoff, Ross, McCawley, and Postal argued for a semantically-based grammar, a model known as generative semantics. The dissension regarding the architecture of grammar between Chomskyans and generative semanticists has aptly been characterized metaphorically as "linguistics wars" by Randy A. Harris (1993) (for further details about these theoretical controversies, see also Gutknecht and Panther 1973) . Although, in some respects, generative semantics was still committed to the Chomskyan paradigm, the focus on meaning and pragmatic use constituted an important step forward to a cognitive linguistic approach to language. George Lakoff (1987: 82) regards "cognitive grammar as an updated version of generative semantics". As a convenient point of departure for a brief description of some important features of Cognitive Linguistics, it might be helpful for the reader to consider human cognition and its relation to other "peripheral systems" as diagrammed in Figure 1 . Following Panther and Radden (2011), we regard cognition in the narrow sense as consisting, among other things, of the higher mental faculties of humans to reason and to infer, to categorize, to construct cognitive models (framing), to blend two or more concepts into a new concept (see Fauconnier and Turner 2002) , and to perspectivize. In this contribution, for reasons of space, we focus on the mental skills of analogical thinking (conceptual metaphor) and, in particular, of forming associations among concepts (conceptual metonymy), with occasional references to some additional important cognitive faculties listed in Figure 1 . These cognitive abilities interact with (as indicated by the double-headed arrows), i.e. feed into and receive feedback from, peripheral systems such as bodily experience, perception, emotion, action (including social and communicative interaction), culture, and, importantly, language. We claim that an adequate cognitive theory of language has to take the parameters diagrammed in Figure 1 Evans' (2007: 66) formulation, the basic insight of the embodied cognition hypothesis is that "the human mind and conceptual organisation are a function of the way in which our species-specific bodies interact with the environment we inhabit". Figure 1 represents this hypothesis as "peripheral" systems that interact with cognition; e.g. bodily experience, perception, and action. The concept of embodied cognition is highly relevant to the semantics of human languages, in particular, to an adequate understanding of metaphor and metonymy, two basic tropes of thought and language, which are presented and exemplified in the following sections.
Figurative thought and language: metaphor and metonymy

Primary and complex metaphor
In Cognitive Linguistics, metaphor is seen as a prime example of embodied meaning. Two major metaphor theorists, the linguist George Lakoff and the philosopher Mark Johnson Johnson 1980, 1999) , following Joseph Grady (1997) , distinguish between primary and complex metaphors. Primary metaphors are directly related to experience, often bodily experience, and, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 50) , they constitute basic conceptual correlations from which complex metaphors are built up. In what follows, the subscript S stands for the metaphorical source and T for the metaphorical target; the double-lined arrow '' symbolizes the metaphorical relation between the source and the target meaning. "… the people you are most intimate with are typically the people you have spent time physically close to: your family, lover, and so on."
Complex metaphors can be seen as (at least partially) iconic relations, i.e. structure-preserving mappings from one conceptual frame (source) into another (for discussion, see Panther 2006) . The schematic structure of complex linguistic metaphors is diagrammed in Figure 2 . A metaphor is produced in a certain (extralinguistic) situation and a (linguistic) context. The word or expression that triggers the metaphor is called the linguistic vehicle, which conveys a conventional ("literal") meaning, the source meaning. This meaning is represented by means of a conceptual frame, a mental representation in terms of meaning components that entertain various conceptual and encyclopedic relations with one another (see Ziem 2014 for an in-depth introduction to and discussion of frame semantics). Components of the source frame are iconically mapped onto another distinct conceptual frame, the target. The target frame is thus structurally isomorphic to the source frame, i.e., it is a kind of analogical replica of the source frame (see the characterization of metaphor as analogical thinking in Figure 1 ). The notion of complex metaphor can be illustrated with some lines from William Shakespeare's comedy As You Like It, Act II, Scene VII:
(3) All the world's a stage, And all the men and women merely players; They have their exits and their entrances, And one man in his time plays many parts, His acts being seven ages.
At the most schematic level the underlying metaphor in (3) can be notated Figure 3 ), which implies a number of submetaphors (in normal print): . Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 60-62) suggest that this metaphor is based on a cultural model such as (4) that involves primary metaphors as in (5) 
Metaphorical framing
In Figure 1 , the double-headed arrows that connect cognition to various peripheral systems, one of which is language, indicate the possibility that the linked components mutually influence each other (see Panther and Radden 2011 for detailed discussion). With regard to metaphor, the notation suggests that this trope is not merely a façon de parler but that it may reflect the ways language users think about the world, i.e. metaphors may "frame" people's thinking. In what follows, by way of example, we report an experiment conducted by cognitive psychologists Paul Thibodeau and Lera Boroditsky (2011) that supports the Lakoffian claim that metaphor does indeed have an impact on cognition. In Thibodeau and Boroditsky's experiments, participants, who were divided into two groups, were given a text about the crime rate in a fictitious town named 'Addison'. The first group read a text that systematically conceptualized crime as a virus (see (6)) whereas the second group received a text that conveyed the same content but metaphorized crime as a wild beast (see (7)) (Thibodeau and Boroditsky 2011: 3):
Crime is a virus infecting the city of Addison. The crime rate in the once, peaceful city has steadily increased over the past three years. In fact, these days it seems that crime is plaguing every neighborhood (…)." (7) Group 2: WILD BEAST S  CrIME T "Crime is a wild beast preying on the city of Addison. The crime rate in the once peaceful city has steadily increased over the past three years. In fact, these days it seems that crime is lurking in every neighborhood (…)."
After the participants had read their respective texts, they were asked, among other things, the following question: "In your opinion, what does Addison need to do to reduce crime?" Thibodeau and Boroditsky found (ibid.: 4) that " [p] articipants given the crime-as-beast metaphorical framing were more likely to propose enforcement (74%) than participants given the crime-asvirus framing (56%)". In general, Group 1 participants, who were exposed to the metaphor VIrUS S  CrIME T , recommended better education, reduction of poverty, and social reform as effective measures to reduce the crime rate, whereas Group 2 participants, who had been subjected to the metaphor WILD BEAST S  CrIME T , were in favor of law enforcement, police force, and prison sentences to achieve the same objective. In conclusion, there is some evidence that metaphors have an influence on how people think and behave (for the role of metaphorical framing in political discourse, see e.g. Lakoff 2016 and Wehling 2016) .
Metonymy
Like metaphor, metonymy is a ubiquitous phenomenon in ordinary language. To begin with, consider an inscription found on many ATMs (an abbreviation for 'Automated Teller Machine') in England:
Only very naive people would take message (8) as meaning that the ATM in question dispenses free money. A more plausible interpretation, in line with language users' world knowledge and social experience, is that customers can withdraw money from their own bank accounts without being charged a service fee. As a further example, consider the advertisement (9) Great hair doesn't happen by chance … it happens by appointment.
Great hair is a substance (nice to look at), but since it is not an event, it cannot happen. Nevertheless, it is possible to reinterpret great hair metonymically as an event; more precisely, a set of actions performed by a hairdresser that results in good-looking hair. This interpretation is reinforced by the prepositional phrase by appointment, which marks the beginning of a series of actions that lead to the desired result great hair. Examples (8) and (9) illustrate the pervasive phenomenon of metonymy. Some cognitive linguists, including the present authors, regard conceptual metonymy as an even more basic figure of thought and language than metaphor. The basic metonymic relation is diagrammed in Figure 5 . In what follows, some characteristics of metonymy are listed:
i. Metonymy is an associative or, from a semiotic perspective, indexical relation between meaning components within one conceptual frame (in contrast to metaphor, which is an iconic relation between two conceptual frames). ii. Metonymy is not specific to language but exists in other semiotic modes, such as e.g. the visual arts (see Panther 2005) . 1 iii. Metonymy involves a linguistic vehicle that denotes a semantic component in a conceptual frame, the source meaning, which, in turn, serves as a conceptual vehicle to access a target meaning (see Kövecses and Radden 1998; Radden and Kövecses 1999) . The source meaning is conceptually integrated into the target meaning as a result of the metonymic operation.
1 This is a feature that metonymy shares with metaphor.
iv. The relation between source and target is conceptually tight (cf. Panther and Thornburg 1998; see also Fauconnier and Turner's 2002 notion of conceptual compression). v. The relation between source and target is typically contingent, i.e. conceptually non-necessary. vi. Languages may differ as to the conceptual relations they metonymically exploit.
Using the subscripts S and T for 'source meaning' and 'target meaning', respectively (as before for metaphor), and the single-lined arrow '→' for the metonymic relation, we represent the link between the source and the target meaning as in (10), exemplified by (11):
Some typical metonymic relations exploited in English and other languages are:
Locations and events that happen there The virtual and the actual (15) He was able to do it → 'He managed to do it'
The following pragmatic types of metonymy can be distinguished (see Panther and Thornburg 1998) : (i) propositional metonymies, which can be referential and/or predicational, and (ii) illocutionary metonymies (see Searle 1969 for the distinction between propositions (reference, predication) and illocution). In (18), reference is made to boots on the ground, and this nominal expression is a conventional metonymy for 'troops/soldiers on the ground'. The metonymic relationship between the source and the target meaning can be notated as in (22) 
Referential metonymies
Predicational metonymies
Predicational metonymies operate on the verb phrase of sentences. Some examples are: In (24)- (26), some event or action that, literally, is merely coded as potential is interpreted as really occurring. The metonymies at work in these examples are given in (27), (28) This metonymy is extremely productive in e.g. English and German, but Panther and Thornburg (1999a) , who call this metonymy POTENTIALITY FOr ACTU-ALITY, show that its use is more restricted in Hungarian.
Illocutionary metonymies
The third metonymy type can be called 'illocutionary metonymy' because it operates on the speech act level. The conceptual-pragmatic structure of illocutionary acts can be described in terms of illocutionary frames or, equiva-lently, speech act scenarios (the latter term was coined by Thornburg and Panther 1997) . To illustrate the workings of illocutionary metonymy, consider a simplified speech act scenario for directive speech acts such as requests (cf. the analysis of requests proposed by Searle 1969: 67, which, in some respects, differs from the one proposed here).
Figure 6. Illocutionary frame of a request
The illocutionary frame in Figure 6 is organized in the following way. There are phases or stages that are ordered along the time axis T, with t 0 designating the time of the performance of the illocutionary act, viz. what is referred to as the COrE in Figure 6 . The COrE is preceded by the BEFOrE, i.e. conditions that should be fulfilled for a felicitous performance of the illocutionary act, e.g. the condition that the hearer is able to perform the action requested, and the mental attitude condition (called 'sincerity condition' in speech act theory) that the speaker wants the hearer to perform the action. The actual performance of the illocutionary act has the immediate effect that the hearer is (more or less strongly) under an obligation to perform the action (rESULTANT OBLIGATION); and if the obligation is accepted, the hearer should be willing to perform the action (rESULTANT WILL-INGNESS). Finally, there is the phase of satisfaction of the request, i.e. the hearer's actual implementation of the action, which is named the AFTEr in Figure 6 . What is the descriptive or even explanatory value of assuming a frame or scenario approach to speech acts? In a nutshell, its strength is that it allows a cognitive linguistic account of what Searle (1975) calls indirect speech acts in terms of conceptual metonymy. When performing an indirect speech act, the speaker selects one element from the components BEFOrE, rESULTANT OBLIGA-TION, rESULTANT WILLINGNESS, or AFTEr as the metonymic source and in doing so provides the hearer with cues to mentally access the intended target meaning, i.e. the COrE of the illocutionary frame. The following examples illustrate this approach to indirect speech acts: 2 BEFOrE S → COrE T (31) Can/could you turn of the light? (32) You can turn off the light. 
The role of metonymy in semantic-pragmatic conflicts
In this section, the importance of metonymy in language is further evidenced by the role it plays in the resolution of conceptual conflicts between word meaning and construction meaning. While the concept 'word' can be taken for granted, it is necessary to provide a working definition of the notion of construction. A good starting point is the by now classical definition proposed by Adele Goldberg (1995: 4) :
"C is a CONSTrUCTION iff def C is a form-meaning pair <F i, S i > such that some aspect of F i or some aspect of S i is not strictly predictable from C's component parts or from some other previously established constructions."
In a more recent monograph, Goldberg (2006: 5) abandons the unpredictability constraint on the form and/or meaning of constructions, but now treats meaningful morphosyntactic patterns as constructions as long as they occur with "sufficient frequency". Nevertheless, constructions, i.e. frequently recurring patterns, often exhibit idiomatic, i.e. not completely compositional (predictable) meanings, and this fact is a good reason for regarding constructions as semiotic units in their own right. We illustrate the conflict between word meaning and construction meaning with what Thornburg (1999b, 2000) call Action constructions, i.e. constructions that, in the default case, require reference to an action performed by the speaker, the hearer, or a third party. Here is a (non-exhaustive) list of such Action constructions with illustrative examples (see also Panther and Thornburg 1999b: 38-39) Some brief comments on the above-mentioned constructions are in order. The communicative function of the imperatives (38)- (39) is directive; the hearer is asked to perform a future action. As to the constructional schema What about V ING […] ?, exemplified by utterances (40) and (41), it functions pragmatically as a suggestion about what the hearer could do or ought to do in the future. Infinitive complement clauses headed by directive verbs like ask (to) or commissive verbs like promise, as in (42)- (43), usually license an action verb in the complement clause. A potential future action is also referred to by the infinitival verb in the construction Why not V INF […] ?, which in (44)- (45) has the illocutionary potential of a strong suggestion with the meaning 'There is no (good) reason why the action denoted by V should not be carried out'. Finally, the construction How to V INF […] , instantiated by (46)- (47), expresses an open proposition, whose variable pronoun how is specified in the subsequent discourse. This construction often appears in book titles or headlines of magazine articles, and the like. On closer inspection, the generalization that the constructions instantiated by examples (38)- (47) require verbs denoting actions, is however falsified by authentic data such as (48)- (69) For reasons of space, we limit our analysis to two examples of non-action verbs in Action constructions. Consider first the well-known ancient Greek aphorism γνῶθι σεαυτόν (gnōthi seauton), whose English translation in (48) is repeated in (70):
Know is a mental-state verb and, given the directive illocutionary force of imperatives, a conceptual conflict arises between the propositional content of the imperative, which expresses a future action to be performed by the addressee of the speech act, and the stative meaning of the verb. Despite this conceptual discrepancy, know can be used in imperatives in English; and this usage is by no means exceptional -there are hundreds of examples in the American English online corpus COCA. How can these conflicting meanings, i.e. the construction meaning and the lexical meaning be reconciled? A simple but appealing solution to this problem is to interpret know as the resultant mental state of a cognitive action. What is overtly coded linguistically is merely the effect of this mental action, viz. know; the action that leads to this result remains implicit. More generally, there exists a highly productive metonymic principle in English that can be notated as:
It is interesting to compare the English translation of the Greek aphorism with its rendition in German: In German, the literal equivalent of English Know yourself/thyself as in (72b) is not possible (the asterisk marks unacceptability); instead a more dynamic predicate such as sich selbst erkennen 'get to know oneself', an ACCOMPLISH-MENT (in the terminology of the linguistic philosopher Zeno Vendler 1957) is used, which expresses a mental or perceptual action. To put it negatively, the metonymy (71) (73) How to be happy.
The meaning of (73) can be paraphrased roughly as 'The author offers his readership information about how they can achieve happiness'. Figure 7 diagrams the conceptual clash between the meaning of the construction, which designates an ACTION r to be performed by the reader R, and the meaning of happy, i.e. the reader's prospective mental state STATE r . The resolution of this semantic conflict is achieved by a process of aspectual coercion (see e.g. Michaelis 2004); i.e., the actional construction meaning coerces the stative meaning of happy into an ACTION sense. The first step towards this target meaning is a (metonymically induced) reinterpretation of happy as a rESULTANT STATE r . In the second and final step, this rESULTANT STATE is interpreted as the effect of the reader's ACTION r (or a series of actions). This target meaning is perfectly congruent with the meaning of the ACTION sense of the construction. In conclusion, it is important to note that the possibility of harmonizing constructional meaning and lexical meaning is not just a matter of language, but rather crucially depends on the language users' folk or cultural models. As for happiness, people have divergent views on whether it can be achieved intentionally by a series of actions or whether happiness is "in the genes", i.e. a state of mind that cannot be brought about deliberately (see Panther and Thornburg 2000 on this topic).
Metonymy outside language
In this section, a case is made for the existence of cross-modal metonymies, i.e. metonymies that operate not only in natural language but also in other sign systems, such as the visual arts (see also Panther 2005: 24-30 The Percept Subject construction is diagrammatically represented in Figure 8 . The first line of the upper rectangle of Figure 8 represents the syntactic structure (FOrM) of the construction. The second line of the upper rectangle represents the (literal) meaning of the construction (SOUrCE MEANING), which is notated in a simplified predicate calculus format. Lines connect the syntactic constituents to their respective meaning components: NP 1 to PErCEPT, V cop to PErCEIVE, Adj to PrOPErTY, and the optional prepositional phrase to NP 2 to ExPErIENCEr. In the italicized parts of (75), the PErCEPT is the referent of the pronoun he (= Kevin). The predicate consists of a copular verb of perception (looks) and an adjective denoting a psychological property (worried, scared, and strong). The optional argument of the Percept Subject construction is the ExPErIENCEr argument, which is coded syntactically as to me in two sentences. In general terms, the source meaning in Figure 8 expresses some state-of-affairs that appears to be the case, i.e. whose factuality has not been established. Yet, given that sensory experience, especially visual perception, is an important source of knowledge, a strong expectation is triggered by the construction meaning that the PrOPErTY predicated of the PErCEPT actually holds in reality, i.e. exists. This target interpretation is notated in the lower rectangle of Figure   4 Heim (2007: 68) Panther (2005) . As an example, consider Figure 9 , a portrait of a 15th century aristocratic woman, Ginevra de' Benci, painted by Leonardo da Vinci. It is clear that the writer regards the sulky, unforgiving, haughty, and withdrawn look of the portrayed lady's face as strong indices that she is actually sulky, unforgiving, haughty, and withdrawn. Furthermore, these mental states and character traits are assumed to be indications of another emotional state, viz. that Ginevra is "not entirely happy regarding her forthcoming marriage". 6 From another analytical perspective, the perceptual attributes listed in (77) can also be seen as links in a causal chain (see Figure 10 ). The author of the portrait observes certain features of Ginevra's face: for example, she does not smile, her left eye is slightly smaller than her right eye, the latter looking "beyond [the viewer] to some invisible point". These physical features are perceived as symptoms of specific mental and emotional states such as the ones described in (77) (sulky, unforgiving, haughty, withdrawn) . From there it is only one inferential step to the conclusion that these mental states are not just perceived -they are real. In other words, the facial features observed by the viewer are caused by underlying existing mental and emotional states of the portrayed lady. What is at work here -both in the interpretation of natural language constructions and of a piece of visual art -is the high-level metonymy EFFECT → CAUSE. What is perceivable is the effect; the cause must be inferred. From the vantage point of the metonymy EFFECT → CAUSE, the target of the metonymy APPEArANCE → rEALITY can be interpreted as CAUSE; in the underlying folk model, which is reflected in both natural language and the semiotics of visual art interpretation, APPEArANCE is conceived of as caused by rEALITY. Figure 10 . From symptoms to underlying causes: the metonymy EFFECT → CAUSE
In lieu of a conclusion
The focus of this contribution has been on the two tropes of metaphor and metonymy, which, in Cognitive Linguistics, are regarded not solely as figures of language, but, equally important, as figures of thought. Along with other cognitive linguists (e.g. Barcelona 2000; Radden 2002; Panther and Thornburg 2007) , the present authors consider conceptual metonymy, i.e. associative thinking, as even more fundamental than metaphor. Metonymic reasoning is ubiquitous in natural language, but, as has been argued in section 5 of this contribution, metonymic thinking is also operative in other semiotic modes, e.g. in the interpretation of visual art. Prima facie, the interpretation of metonymies could be regarded as a kind of "mind-reading", as understood in cognitive psychology, since the target sense of a metonymy is not overtly coded but is implied by the speaker and has to 5 Note that for reasons of simplicity the source meaning, which, as pointed out in section 3.3, is a conceptual part of the source meaning (see (10)), has not been incorporated into the target meaning of Figure 8 . An anonymous reviewer appears to attribute to us the idea that metonymy is the only relevant cognitive tool in the interpretation of visual art. We do not claim this, but merely want to demonstrate, by way of example, that metonymy is operative in other semiotic modes than language. We completely agree with the reviewer that the metonymic approach will not necessarily yield satisfactory results with works from other periods and/or styles in the history of the visual arts.
be inferred by the hearer. According to Deirdre Wilson (2005: 386) "… mind-reading is not a single homogeneous module but a set of special-purpose mechanisms or submodules (…) these may include a dedicated comprehension mechanism, an evolved mental organ with its own special purpose principles or procedures."
We hope to have presented some evidence in this contribution that metonymic reasoning is not a "dedicated comprehension mechanism", but rather a cognitive tool, which provides all-purpose inference schemas that are applied inside and outside language.
